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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
Case No. 940494-CA
v.
Priority No. 2

ALBERT R. JARAMILLO,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AHP NATURE py PfrQCSPPINgS
This Court has original appellate jurisdiction over this
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).
This appeal challenges the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant.
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court correctly find that the search warrant
was issued prior to the commencement of the search?
Whether the search warrant was issued before the search was
executed is a question of fact, which this Court modifies only if
the finding is clearly erroneous.
935-36.

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932,

A factual finding is clearly erroneous only if it is not

adequately supported by the record, "resolving all disputes in

the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's
determination." Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant provisions are attached to this brief in
Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
Defendant contests the validity of the search warrant by
which the police searched his car and ultimately seized cocaine.
(R. 155). Defendant moved to suppress the evidence taken via the
search because the search warrant did not contain any notation as
to its time of issuance; therefore, he argues, the warrant may
have been issued after the search took place.

(R. 276-277).

The

trial court denied the motion to suppress and the evidence was
later admitted at the trial.

(Id.) A jury convicted Defendant

for possessing drugs with intent to distribute and for failing to
pay drug tax. (R. 71).
Statement of Facts
On February 14, 1995, Sargeant Chris Zimmerman of the WeberMorgan Narcotics Strike Force received a telephone call from a
fellow agent who was conducting surveillance of a yellow
Chevrolet Nova.

(R. 228). At approximately 8:30 that morning,
2

Sargeant Zimmerman met with the agent and discussed information
that the police had obtained on the vehicle.

(Id.)

The agents

decided together that there was sufficient information to request
a search warrant from a judge.

(Id.)

Two agents, Ashment and

Lasater, maintained surveillance on the vehicle while Sargeant
Zimmerman went to the police station to prepare a search warrant.
(R. 229).
Sargeant Zimmerman finished drafting the search warrant at
either 10:30 or 10:45 a.m. and then waited approximately 15
minutes for Judge Parley Baldwin to take a recess from his court
calendar to review and sign the warrant.

(Id.)

Judge Baldwin

testified that he could not remember the time he signed the
warrant, but he also stated that he had no reason to dispute
Sargeant Zimmerman's recollection that it occurred at
approximately 11:00 a.m.

(R. 227).

Once he obtained the search warrant, Sargeant Zimmerman
orally informed the surveillance agents.

(R. 229) . Instead of

immediately searching the vehicle, the officers decided to wait
until someone took the car.

(R. 229)

At approximately noon,

Defendant entered the car and began driving away.

(R. 230)

Within a few minutes, the officers stopped the car and began

3

searching both the car and Defendant.
cocaine,

(Id.)

The officers found

(R. 106).

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial
court ruled that Sargeant Zimmerman's account of the chronologywas credible and that, based on the evidence, the warrant was
obtained prior to the stop and the search.

(R. 279)

On that

ground, the trial court held that the search warrant was in
effect when the search occurred and, therefore, denied the motion
to suppress.

(R. 278).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court must accept the trial court's factual findings
unless Defendant marshals all the evidence in support of the
trial court decision and then demonstrates the "fatal flaw" in
that factual decision.

Though the transcript of the relevant

hearing is replete with evidence that supports the trial court,
Defendant neither marshals it nor shows how that evidence fails
to support the court's factual decision that the warrant was in
effect at the time of the search.
Defendant's argument essentially relies on two fundamentally
incorrect propositions: 1) a search warrant, based on an
affidavit, must state the time it was issued; and 2) absent an
indication of the time of issuance, the trial court must assume
4

that the police carried out the search before the warrant was
issued.

However, Defendant cites no authority for either

premise.

Further, he does not refer to any cases requiring that

courts assume police officers conduct searches without required
warrants.
Here the court heard evidence from the judge that signed the
search warrant, and three of the officers involved in the
investigation and search.

Based on this evidence, the trial

court found that the search warrant was in effect and denied the
motion to suppress.

That decision was ultimately based on the

trial court's judgment that Judge Baldwin and the officers were
credible and that their recollection of the chronology of events
was accurate.

Indeed, Defendant put on no evidence disputing the

State's contention that the warrant was issued at approximately
11:00 a.m. on February 14, 1994, one hour before the search
occurred.

AfrgVMENT
I.

DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE
LEGAL CITATION OR ANALYSIS RENDERS
THIS COURT UNABLE TO REVIEW ON
APPEAL THE ISSUE OF THE LEGALITY OF
THE SEARCH WARRANT,

Defendant challenges the trial court's "choice" to believe
the police officers in denying the motion to suppress. (Brief of
5

Appellant at 7).

However, he provides no legal authority to

support his view that this choice was incorrect.

Defendant

recites testimony from the suppression hearing, impugns the trial
court's determination and concludes with the unsupported
assertion that the trial court erred because it could not find
"with certainty" that the search warrant was issued before the
search.
Defendant cites to only one case, State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d
640 (Utah App. 1993), which is used in the standard of review
portion of the brief.

For the rest of his assertions of law,

Defendant fails to include any citations to authority or legal
analysis.

An unstated, though implicit fundament of the brief is

the proposition that a search warrant, even when based on an
affidavit, must state the time it was issued.

For this novel

rule Defendant provides no citation nor does he even purport to
analyze why such a rule should be made.

In his conclusion,

Defendant states that the trial court erred because it did not
find that the search warrant was issued before the search "with
certainty."

Though this extraordinarily high burden of proof is

stricter than even the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden in
criminal trials, Defendant refers to no cases that state
"certainty" is required in suppression hearings.
6

The rules of appellate procedure expressly require that a
brief include an argument which "shall contain the contentions
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on."

Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9) (1994).

Defendant's brief fails to set forth the legal analysis or
authority that this Court has consistently required; therefore,
his "argument" is legally meaningless and does not merit review
by this Court.

State v. Price. 827 P.2d 247, 248-49 n.5 (Utah

App. 1992); State v. Day. 815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991).
II.

EVEN ASSUMING THAT DEFENDANT'S
BRIEF COMPLIES WITH RULE 24, HE
FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ANDf
THEREFORE, THIS COURT MUST ACCEPT
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDING
AND AFFIRM ITS DENIAL OF THE MOTION
TO SUPPRESS.

Defendant not only contests the trial court's decision to
believe the police officers' statement of the facts, but also
presents an underlying legal assertion: that a search warrant
must have the time it was issued on its face to be valid.
Forgetting for the moment that Defendant has cited no authority
for this proposition, the statement is incorrect as a matter of
law.

Although Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-204(2) (a) (1995) does

require the magistrate to enter the time of issuance when a
7

telephonic warrant is issued based on sworn oral testimony, the
law does not impose a similar requirement for personally
presented warrants that are based on an affidavit.

Defendant's

underlying legal claim, that the search warrant was invalid
because it did not state the time of issuance, therefore is
inapplicable to this case.
This Court has consistently affirmed that an appellant's
duty to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's ruling
is fundamental to an attack on a factual finding.

Norman H.

Jackson, 7 Utah Bar J. Utah Standards

Review

of Appellate

9, 13

(1994) . The duty to marshal does not end at the accumulation of
all the evidence in support of the decision.

The appellant must

then show that the evidence is "legally insufficient to support
the findings when viewing the evidence and inferences in a light
most favorable to the decision."

Id.: State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d

487, 491 (Utah App. 1992).
When it announced that it was denying Defendant's motion to
suppress, the trial judge explained his reasoning and summarized
the evidence accumulated at the hearing:
After hearing the testimony given by the
agent-detectives that were involved in this
case, it appears believable to the Court that
the reason Zimmerman left after meeting with
Ashment was to go and get a search warrant.
8

And that the time frame that he described is
about how long it would have taken him to
prepare it and go get it signed. . . .[0]n
the balance of the evidence presented, I
believe that the search warrant was obtained
prior to this stop, and prior to the search
being effectuated.
(R. 278-79) The court's decision was based on the credibility of
the only witnesses before it, the agents who watched the vehicle,
the officer who obtained the search warrant, and the circuit
court judge who signed the warrant.

In substance, Defendant

urged the court, and now urges this Court, to disbelieve the only
evidence offered.

Determination of factual questions though

necessarily involves judgments about witness credibility and such
judgments are best left to the trial courts. See State v.
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993)(clearly erroneous
standard recognizes trial court's advantaged position in judging
credibility).

Because Defendant presents no legal authority for

his assertions nor establishes that the court's factual findings
are unsupported by the evidence, this Court should affirm the
trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.
CQNCLWIQN
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.

9

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
Because the facts and legal arguments are adequately
presented in the briefs, oral argument would not significantly
aid the Court in deciding this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ^ ' ^ d a y of March 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

.JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM

77-23-204.

Examination of complainant and witnesses Witness not in physical presence of
magistrate - Duplicate original warrants Return.

(1) All evidence to be considered by a magistrate in the
issuance of a search warrant shall be given on oath and either
reduced to writing or recorded verbatim. Transcription of the
recorded testimony need not precede the issuance of the warrant.
Any person having standing to contest the search may request and
shall be provided with a transcription of the recorded testimony
in support of the application for the warrant.
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in
the absence of an affidavit, a search warrant may be issued upon
sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the physical
presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate is satisfied
that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. The
sworn oral testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by
telephone or other appropriate means and shall be recorded and
transcribed. After transcription, the statement shall be
certified by the magistrate and filed with the court. This
statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for purposes of this
section.
(a) The grounds for issuance and contents of the warrant
issued pursuant to Subsection (2) shall be those required by this
chapter. Prior to issuance of the warrant, the magistrate shall
require the law enforcement officer or the prosecuting attorney
who is requesting the warrant to read to him verbatim the
contents of the warrant. The magistrate may direct that specific
modifications be made in the warrant. Upon approval, the
magistrate shall direct the law enforcement officer or the
prosecuting attorney for the government who is requesting the
warrant to sign the magistrate's name on the warrant. This
warrant shall be called a duplicate original warrant and shall be
deemed a warrant for purposes of this chapter. In these cases the
magistrate shall cause to be made an original warrant. The
magistrate shall enter the exact time of issuance of the
duplicate original warrant on the face of the original warrant.
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the original
warrant shall be in conformity with this chapter. Upon return,
the magistrate shall require the person who gave the sworn oral
testimony establishing the grounds for issuance of the warrant to
sign a copy of the transcript.
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall issue
a search warrant.

